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INTRODUCTION
Specific jurisdiction in civil litigation centers on the rather general,
yet immutable, concept of intention.1 Although the word “intention” does
not surface prominently in the personal jurisdiction case law,2 it is clearly
intrinsic to the concept of “purposeful availment”.3

On the Internet,

however, intention is hard to ascertain: how does a court, for example,
determine whether the defendant intended that its website, application, or
advertisement within a mobile application should end up in the forum
state?4 In answering such a question, courts have historically used one of
two approaches to establish intent: (i) a targeting test5 or (ii) a degree of
activity test.6 Both tests require courts to examine the content of the
defendant’s website: while the former asks whether a defendant aimed its

See generally Asahi Metal Indus. Co v Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987); J.
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
2 I have introduced the term “intention” to be used interchangeably with “purposeful” for
two reasons. First, its usage foreshadows a later discussion of whether Internet users
intend to use a content delivery network. It seems cumbersome to ask, instead, whether
internet users “purposefully use” or “use on purpose” a content delivery network. Such
usage appears stylistically grating. Second, “intention”, as a general legal concept is more
intuitively relatable to the legally-versed reader than “purposeful”. The term intention
surfaces in many contexts, such as criminal intent (mens rea) in criminal law, the
intention to create legal relations in contract law, or certainty of intention in trusts law.
3 Burger King Corp v. Rudzewicz 471 U.S. 462, 479 (1985) (noting that the due process
analysis requires the court to determine “whether the defendant purposefully established
minimum contacts”) (emphasis added).
4 See UTA KOHL, JURISDICTION AND THE INTERNET: REGULATORY COMPETENCE OVER
ONLINE ACTIVITY, 96 (1st ed. 2007) (noting that mere accessibility of content does not
appear to be sufficient to attract jurisdiction). See also JOANNA KULESZA, INTERNATIONAL
INTERNET LAW 87 – 97 (1st ed. 2012) (discussing generally the US approaches to personal
jurisdiction on the Internet).
5 See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (representing the US Supreme Court’s seminal
case on the targeting test); see also Mecklermedia Corp v. DC Congress GmbH [1998] 1
All ER 148 (representing an early decision made outside the US that considered the
targeting test).
6 See Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com Inc., 952 F Supp 1119 (WD Pa 1997)
(articulating what has often been called the “Zippo” test or “sliding scale” method).
1
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website at the forum, the latter asks whether a website is passive,
interactive or active. No court, however, has looked “under the hood”,7 at
the Internet backbone itself, to establish whether a defendant is using the
technological infrastructure of the Internet to purposefully avail itself of –
and thereby establish minimum contacts with – the forum.8 This essay fills
that gap:

I propose that the purposeful availment test – a necessary

element for specific jurisdiction – is satisfied when a defendant employs a
content delivery network (“CDN”) to exploit a forum market (“the CDN
approach”).9
Part I of this essay canvasses the specific personal jurisdiction
framework. Part II sets forth the CDN approach and integrates it with
purposeful availment. A CDN is a geographically distributed system of
physical servers that make websites and other content available to users
across the world. I argue that, if a defendant elects to use a CDN in the
forum, then purposeful availment is most likely established. If a defendant
does not elect to use a CDN, then purposeful availment is not established,
except if intention is imputable on the defendant. Without that exception,

To my knowledge and at the time of writing this essay. But to the extent that courts
have addressed the technological architecture of the Internet in their analyses, those
technological aspects discussed do not seem to feature in the same manner as proposed
by this paper. See generally Plixer Int’l Inc. v. Scrutinizer GmbH, 293 F. Supp. 3d 232,
238–40 (D. Me. 2017) (summarizing the various Circuit Court tests for personal
jurisdiction on the Internet).
8 E.g. Bensusan Restaurant Corp v. King, 937 F Supp 295 (SDNY 1996); Cybersell Inc. v.
Cybersell. 130 F 3d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997); Millennium Enters Inc. v. Millennium Music
LP, 33 F Supp 2d 907 (D Or. 1999); Inset Systems Inc. v. Instruction Set Inc. 937 F Supp
161 (D Conn. 1996); Toys ‘R’ Us Inc. v. Step two SA, 318 F 3d 446, 454 (3rd Cir. 2003).
9 Sometimes called content “distribution” networks.
7
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the CDN approach would apply only to a narrow universe of cases. In Part
III, I discuss the feasibility of imputing intention and conclude that
purposeful availment demands strict intention, which hamstrings the scope
of the CDN approach. Nevertheless, in Part IV, I maintain that, regardless
of whether there is an intention requirement, the CDN approach will bring
certainty to personal jurisdiction because people either use a CDN or they
do not. Part V concludes that the CDN approach will give courts improved
facility to assess personal jurisdiction for Internet related cases.
From the outset, however, two caveats. First, although this essay
focuses on only one technological factor for determining minimum contacts,
I do not foreclose the likelihood that there is now, or in the future,
technological indicia other than CDNs that would aid a minimum contacts
analysis on the Internet.10 On a similar matter of scope, this essay only
deals with CDNs as they relate to specific jurisdiction (as opposed to
general) in civil matters (as opposed to criminal). Second, this essay does
not claim that the CDN approach supersedes existing minimum contacts
and purposeful availment doctrine. Rather, I argue that the intentional use
of CDNs constitutes purposeful availment. The CDN approach, therefore,
complements, not substitutes, the prevailing jurisprudence.

Other technological factors to explore may include the use of metadata in targeted
advertising.
10

5

I.

THE US PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORK

A. General and Specific Jurisdiction
Although the following discussion sets out the US private
international law on jurisdiction, the principles discussed, and the CDN
approach proposed, are equally applicable to domestic cases. The terms
“general” and “specific” jurisdiction refer to a civil procedure distinction
within the US private international law for personal jurisdiction.11 General
jurisdiction allows a court to adjudicate any claim against a defendant who
has a certain close and enduring relationship with the forum through
indicia such as nationality, domicile, incorporation or conduct by which a
defendant is “at home” in the forum.12 It is hard to envision how virtual
“presence” through Internet activity would alone render a nonresident
defendant “at home” for general jurisdiction. Accordingly, most Internet
jurisdiction cases involve specific jurisdiction.13
Specific jurisdiction concerns claims that arise out of or are related
to a defendant’s activities in the forum state.14 The traditional test for

HENRIK SPANG-HANSSEN, PUBIC INTERNATIONAL COMPUTER NETWORK LAW ISSUES, 118119 (1st ed. 2006); see also GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS, 88 ( 6th ed. 2018); RAYMOND S. R. KU &
JACQUELINE D. LIPTON, CYBERSPACE LAW CASES AND MATERIALS, 28 (2nd ed. 2006);
Jeanne Huang, Chinese private international law and online data protection, 15 JOURNAL
OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 186, 189 (2019) (discussing rules of personal jurisdiction
in Chinese law in contrast with US rules).
12 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014) (finding that the petitioner,
Daimler, is not at home in the forum, California, and cannot be sued there).
13 E.g. Holland Am. Line Inc v, Wartsila N. Am., Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 460 (9th Cir. 2007).
14 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
11
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establishing specific personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant
has two prongs comprising of statutory and constitutional criteria: the
satisfaction of (i) the state long-arm statute and (ii) due process.15
i.

Long-Arm Statute
An extraterritorial claim must be captured by the forum state’s

long-arm statute.16 Each state in the US has its own rules on when its
courts may serve process on a nonresident defendant, including foreign
defendants.17

Considering that service of process perfects a court’s

jurisdiction over a person,18 long-arm statutes provide the threshold bases
for a state forum’s assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction.19 Some longarm statutes, such as those of New York, Utah, Texas, clearly delineate the
circumstances in which state courts may assert personal jurisdiction.20
Other states, such as California, provide broad and amorphous
long-arm statutes under which a court may, for example, “exercise

International Shoe Company v. Washington State., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding
that due process requires that the defendant, if not present in the forum, to have certain
minimum contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice); see also GEORGE A. BERMANN,
TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN A NUTSHELL, 40 (1st ed. 2003).
16 See Peter Levitt, The extraterritorial assertion of long-arm jurisdiction and the impact
on the international commercial community: a comment and suggested approach, 9 U. PA.
J. INT'L L. 713 (1987).
17 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(K)(1)(A); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408 (1984).
18 See E. Merrick Dodd, Jurisdiction in Personal Actions, 23 ILL. L. REV. 427 (1929); see
also Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 590 F.Supp.1453, 1456 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
(noting that personal jurisdiction comprises of amenability to jurisdiction and notice to
the defendant through valid service of process).
19 E.g. New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 303 (providing for service of process once
the long arm statute is satisfied).
20 E.g. New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 302(a) (permitting the exercise of
personal jurisdiction as to a cause of action arising from acts such as: a business
transaction within the state, a tortious act in the state (except defamation), a tortious act
in the state causing injury to person or property).
15
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jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the constitution of this state
or of the United States”.21 Since there is no federal long-arm statute, in
federal cases, a court will apply the long-arm statute of the state in which
that federal court is sitting.
ii.

Due Process
Even if the state long-arm statute were satisfied, Fifth22 and

Fourteenth23 Amendment considerations may preclude the exercise of
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.24 These Amendments essentially
provide that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of the law, and has been interpreted to, in turn, require a two
pronged enquiry of minimum contacts and reasonableness.25
First, a nonresident defendant must have minimum contacts with
the forum before it can be subjected to the forum’s jurisdiction.26 The
minimum contacts test is satisfied if the defendant purposefully avails itself
of the privilege of doing business in the forum state.27

Purposeful

availment, is a way of operationalizing, and giving measure, to the concept

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code s 410.10 (2016).
Applying to the federal government.
23 Applying to the states.
24 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
25 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, (1980) (setting out a two-part
test where jurisdiction can only be asserted if (i) the defendant has minimum contacts
with the forum as a result of purposefully availing itself of the benefits and protections of
the forum law and (ii) the exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable). See also Mason v.
F. LLI Luigi $ Franco Maschio FU G.B 832 F.2d 383. 386 (7th Cir. 1987); Oaswalt v.
Scripto Inc 616 F.2d 191, 201-202 (5th Cir. 1980).
26 Id.
27 Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98. See also JULIA HORNLE, LAW AND THE INTERNET, 144
(Lilian Edwards & Charlotte Waelde eds., 3rd ed. 2009); Faye Fangfei Wang, Obstacles
and Solutions to Internet Jurisdiction: A Comparative Analysis of the EU and US Laws, 3
J. Int'l Com. L. & Tech. 233 (2008).
21
22
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of minimum contacts.

The purposeful availment test focuses on the

defendant’s intention and is only satisfied when the defendant directs its
activity toward the forum so that the defendant should expect, by virtue of
the benefit it receives, to be subject to the forum’s jurisdiction.28
Second, the reasonableness test requires that the exercise of
jurisdiction does not offend the traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.29 The reasonableness test is not mechanical.30 Rather,
a court will take into account a variety of factors such as: the extent of the
defendant’s purposeful interjection into the forum state's affairs,31 the
defendant’s burden of litigating the claim,32 the forum state’s interest in
adjudicating the dispute,33 the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining effective
relief,34 the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most

United States v. Swiss American Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 623-24 (1st Cir. 2001).
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
30 Insurance Company of North America v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1270 (9th
Cir. 1981).
31 E.g. Cubbage v. Merchant 744 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005
(1985).
32 Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
33 E.g. Hirsh v. Blue Cross, Blue Shield, 800 F.2d 1474, 1481 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that
the forum state, California, had a strong interest in ensuring that its residents have
appropriate redress against insurers who refuse to pay claims); Rocke v. Canadian Auto.
Sport Club, 660 F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding against jurisdiction even though
the forum state had some interest in the adjudication of the dispute).
34 Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
28
29
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efficient resolution of controversies,35 and the states’ shared interest of
advancing fundamental substantive social policies.36
B. Recent Supreme Court Approaches to Specific Jurisdiction
While the Supreme Court has narrowed general jurisdiction,37 it has
hinted at the expansion of specific jurisdiction.38 To set the stage for a
discussion of specific jurisdiction on the Internet, it would be fruitful to
survey three recent Supreme Court cases on specific jurisdiction. All three
cases respond in some way to the splintered decision in Asahi Metal
Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California.39 The common thread among
all ensuing cases is that mere foreseeability or awareness that a product
might enter a forum’s “stream of commerce” is not enough to attract
jurisdiction. Rather, the defendant must have indicated its intent to enter
the forum by establishing minimum contacts.

E.g. Cubbage 744 F.2d at 671. The “efficient resolution interest” might emphasize the
location of evidence and witnesses, often preferring the forum where the injury occurred
or where the witnesses resides. It would tend also to counsel against piecemeal litigation.
These considerations would also appear to overlap with the convenience considerations of
forum non conveniences and, indeed, Justice O’Connor in Asahi appeared to take into
account some factors which would overlap with convenience in her analysis of
reasonableness.
36 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115 (finding that, on a case-by-case basis, a court should examine
the policies of other states or nations whose interests are affected if the forum were to
accept jurisdiction).
37 E.g. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014). Justice Ginsburg took the view
that broad personal general jurisdiction would threaten comity and foreign relations.
Accordingly, general personal jurisdiction should be limited. See also Bernadette B.
Genetin, The Supreme Court’s New Approach to Personal Jurisdiction, 68 SMU L. REV.
107 (2015) (discussing the Court’s narrowing of the scope of general jurisdiction); Charles
W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium in
Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 230–35 (2014) (arguing that Daimler
and Walden shifts the balance of litigation power from plaintiffs to defendants).
38 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 758 n.10 (stating that specific jurisdiction has “flourished” in
recent decades).
39 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
35
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i.

Asahi
In Asahi, the Supreme Court offered several theories on the stream

of commerce doctrine. 40 At issue was whether the minimum contacts test
was satisfied if a defendant were aware that its products could end up in
the forum. The court was unanimous in its decision, but issued a fractured
decision with Justice O’Connor writing for the plurality.
Justice O’Connor, joined by three other justices, propounded the
“stream of commerce – plus” test, which stated that placing a product into
the stream of commerce without “something more” – such as evidence of
intention to serve the forum market – does not constitute purposeful
availment. The defendant’s mere awareness that the stream will or may
sweep the product into the forum is not enough to demonstrate intent to do
business in forum market.41
By contrast, Justice Brennan, joined by three other justices,
proposed the broader “stream of commerce only” test, which stated that, “as
long as a participant in this process is aware that the final product is being
marketed in the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come

In Asahi, a Taiwanese distributor purchased a valve (for the manufacture of motorcycle
wheels) from a Japanese corporation – Asahi. One of these valves were said to have been
the cause of an accident in California. The victim sued the Taiwanese company in
California and the Taiwanese company sought indemnification from Asahi. The
California Supreme Court accepted personal jurisdiction over Asahi on the basis that
Asahi was aware that its products, distributed internationally, would be swept in the
stream of commerce to the United States. The Supreme Court found against jurisdiction.
41 Id. at 112 (O’Connor J). Justice O’Connor provided several examples of “additional
conduct” that would be sufficient to establish minimum contacts: designing the product
for the market in the forum State, advertising in the forum State, establishing channels
for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the product
through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State.
40
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as a surprise”.42

Nonetheless, Justice Brennan found that jurisdiction

would violate fair play and justice, and arrived at the same result as did
Justice O’Connor.43 This sense of fairness appeared to have driven Justice
Stevens, who found that unreasonableness alone, without further
consideration of minimum contacts, was enough to reject jurisdiction. But
to the extent that minimum contacts should be considered, Justice Stevens
suggested that whether placement of a product into the stream of commerce
satisfied minimum contacts turns on “the volume, the value, and the
hazardous character” of the product.44
ii.

Nicastro
Twenty-four years after the split decision in Asahi, the Supreme

Court had the opportunity to clarify the standing of the stream of commerce
doctrine in J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro. Again, however, the court
delivered a splintered decision.

Although this decision is frequently

criticized for leaving the stream of commerce doctrine unsettled,45 it
actually provides more certainty than is initially apparent.

Justice

Ginsburg, although dissenting, appears to apply Justice O’Connor’s “stream
of commerce – plus” test, as did the majority in Nicastro. This unified

Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116-17 (Brennan, J); In Justice Steven’s view, whether conduct rises
to the level of purposeful availment requires a fact-specific, particularised determination
that considers the volume, value, and hazardous character of the products at issue.
43 Id. at 104.
44Id. at 121-22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
45 Kaitlyn Findley, Paddling Past Nicastro in the Stream of Commerce Doctrine:
Interpreting Justice Breyer’s Concurrence as Implicitly Inviting Lower Courts to Develop
Alternative Jurisdictional Stanfards, 63 EMORY LAW JOURNAL 695 (2014) (stating that
Nicastro represented a disappointing split decision that prompted law reviews and courts
alike to adopt divergent perspectives on the stream of commerce doctrine).
42
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approach suggests that the “stream of commerce – plus” test is the yardstick
against which any new doctrine, including the CDN approach, should be
compatible.
In Nicastro,46 four justices found that placing a product into the
stream of commerce, by itself, was not enough to establish jurisdiction.
Rather, McIntyre, the petitioner who manufactured allegedly faulty
products, needed to have targeted the forum.47 Justice Kennedy, writing
for a plurality, focused on whether McIntyre had any contacts with New
Jersey. Justice Kennedy found that although McIntyre had targeted the
entire US market through a distributor it had not specifically targeted New
Jersey and, accordingly, jurisdiction was not established.48
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan
joined in dissent, found that McIntyre had purposefully availed itself of the
forum by promoting and selling its machines to the US market nationwide,
thereby obtaining the benefit of all states in which its products were sold.
Justice Ginsburg’s view may at first inspection sound like Justice Brennan’s
view in Asahi. Justice Ginsburg’s characterization of the case may appear
to relinquish the need for any purposeful availment:

564 U.S. 873 (2011).
In Nicastro, a scrap metal worker in New Jersey had injured his hand with a metalshearing machine. McIntyre, an English corporation, had made the machine in England
and sold it to the US through a distributor.
48 Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 886.
46
47
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A foreign-country manufacturer engages a U. S. company to promote and
distribute the manufacturer’s products, not in any particular State, but anywhere
and everywhere in the United States the distributor can attract purchasers.49

Here, Justice Ginsburg may be misconstrued as suggesting that targeting
the US at-large is the same as targeting a US state.
Upon further inspection, however, Justice Ginsburg’s view is
actually more similar to Justice O’Connor’s “stream of commerce – plus”
doctrine. Justice Ginsburg distinguished Asahi on the basis that Asahi,
unlike McIntyre, did not seek out customers, and advertise its products, in
the forum.

Unlike Justice Brennan, who did not require evidence of

purposeful availment (merely entering the stream of commerce was
enough), Justice Ginsburg did require purposeful availment.

It so

happened that McIntyre purposefully availed itself of the entirety of the
US, including New Jersey.
Accordingly, Justice Ginsburg still focused her analysis on the
question of whether McIntyre had established minimum contacts with New
Jersey. In the circumstances, she found that the product had arrived in
New Jersey “not randomly or fortuitously” but as a result of McIntyre’s
deliberate distribution system.50 Justice Ginsburg applied the same test as
the plurality, only to reach a different conclusion.

49
50

Id.
Id. At 910 (Ginsburg J. in dissent).
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iii.

Walden
Although Walden v. Fiore was not a product liability case, it

established a proposition in similar spirit to Justice O’Connor’s “stream of
commerce – plus” doctrine.51 For the Walden court, an action having effects
in the forum was not enough to attract jurisdiction.52 In an unanimous
decision, the court found that Walden, a government agent who had seized
the respondent in Georgia, was not subject to the Nevada court because he
had not established any contacts with Nevada. The minimum contacts test
looks at the defendant’s contacts with the forum state, not the defendant’s
contacts with the persons who reside there.53
iv.

Bristol-Myers Squibb
In Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court,54 Bristol-Myers Squibb

(“BMS”) made a drug that was sold nationwide.

Eighty-six California

residents and five hundred and seventy-five non-California residents joined
in suing BMS in California, alleging, among other things, side effects
associated with using a drug BMS sold. BMS is incorporated in Delaware,
has its headquarters in New York, and maintains five offices and about 250
representatives in California. Justice Alito, joined by seven other justices,
found against specific jurisdiction because the case did not sufficiently arise

Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014).
In Walden, two professional gamblers had their belongings, including cash, seized in
Atlanta by Walden and other DEA agents. Eventually, the U.S. Attorney in Georgia
found no probable caused and ordered the money to be returned. The gamblers sued
Walden in Nevada alleging unlawful search, unlawful seizure of funds, and submission of
a false affidavit.
53 Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122.
54 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
51
52
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out of or relate to the defendant’s forum activities. Many of the plaintiffs
were not California residents and did not suffer harm there.
The majority essentially solidified the contacts–based approach to
specific jurisdiction and clarified the standard of the nexus required
between the defendant and the forum. The court found that there must be
an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy;
principally, an activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum state
and is therefore subject to the state’s regulation.55
v.

Foreshadowing the CDN Approach
The above string of cases make clear the enduring role of a

defendant’s intention. Mere awareness of entry into a forum, or simply
making contact with people in the forum, is not enough. Specific
jurisdiction is founded on the intentional establishing of contacts with a
forum, even if those same contacts were established with other states. As
discussed later, prioritizing intention will limit the CDN approach’s scope.
Fortuitous use of a CDN is not enough to draw a defendant into the forum
courts. Only the intentional deployment of a CDN for the purpose of
exploiting the forum market will bring a defendant within the forum’s
jurisdiction.
C. Specific Jurisdiction on the Internet Now
Although none of the above cases dealt with specific jurisdiction on
the Internet, in some instances, the Court had the Internet in mind. In

55

Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780
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Nicastro, the plurality had found that no jurisdiction would be established
if a defendant does not intend to submit itself to the power of a sovereign or
cannot be said to have targeted the forum. But Justice Breyer may have
been cognizant of the Internet when he refrained from announcing “a rule
of broad applicability” that may not align with “modern-day consequences”
given the “increasingly fast-paced globalization of the world economy”.56
Justice Breyer asked how personal jurisdiction applies “when a company
targets the world selling by products from its website?”.57 In Walden, the
court touched on this question but did not answer it: “this case does not
present the very different questions whether and how a defendant’s virtual
“presence” and conduct translate into “contacts” with a particular State […]
We leave questions about virtual contacts for another day”.58
While this question has remained unanswered, commentators and
lower courts have taken diverse views.59 Some argue that the existing
private international law rules on jurisdiction are enough to deal with the
emerging problems of the Internet.60

Others believe that the Internet

Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 887 (Breyer J).
Id. at 890.
58 Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 290 n.9 (2014).
59 E.g. Steven M. Bellovin, Jurisdiction and the Internet, 15 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 96
(2017) (arguing that an ideal solution to Internet jurisdiction should be intuitive, resist
easy manipulation by suspects or law enforcement and respect user privacy).
60 E.g. Alan M. Trammell & Derek E. Bambauer, Personal Jurisdiction and the
“Interwebs”, 100 Cornell L. Rev. 1129, 1167 (2015) (arguing that virtual conduct does not
create any meaningful connection with a forum); A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction and
the Internet: Returning to Traditional Principles to Analyze Network-Mediated Contacts, 1
UNIV. ILL. LAW. REV. 71 (2006) (arguing for the reinstitution of traditional territorial
principles to analyze Internet contacts in light of current technology that enables
Internet actors to restrict the geographical reach of their virtual activities); Anne
McCafferty, Internet Contracting and E-Commerce Disputes: International and U.S.
Personal Jurisdiction, 2 GLOBAL BUS. L. REV. 95 (2011) (proposing a broad model statute
56
57
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represents a different creature that warrants different treatment, perhaps
by the imposition of a cyber-dedicated legislation.61 Those in the middle
stop short of proposing revolutionary legislative solutions, but advocate for
tweaks to existing principles.62 Courts have also struggled to find a clear
test to determine what sort and level of Internet activity will cause a
defendant to have established minimum contacts with the forum. Within
this struggle, two strands of jurisprudence have emerged: the degree of
activity test and the targeting test.
i.

The Degree of Activity Test
The degree of activity test, also known as the “Zippo” test, after the

case Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.,63 assumes that due
process is proportionate to the nature and extent of commercial activity

– in the form of a federal long-arm statute – which would enable, subject to due process,
jurisdiction on the basis of transaction any business in the US).
61 E.g. David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders – The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996) (arguing that the Internet requires rules
distinct from the laws that regulate physical, geographically defined territories –
cyberspace is a unique space, bounded by screens, passwords, IP addresses, that deserves
different rules); Damon C. Andrews & John M. Newman, Personal Jurisdiction and
Choice of Law in the Cloud, 73 Md. L. Rev. 313, 364–71 (2013) (arguing for the creation of
a distinct jurisdiction, free from geographic boundaries, for cloud-computing); Stephen E.
Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 108 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1301, 1301
(2014) (arguing for the imposition of a nationwide framework of federal personal
jurisdiction in order to relieve federal courts of their jurisdictional dependence on state
borders); BRIAN FITZGERALD AND SAMPSUNG XIAOXIANG SHI, COPYRIGHT LAW, DIGITAL
CONTENT AND THE INTERNET IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC (Brian Fitzgerald et al. eds., 1st ed.
2008) (arguing for international revision and harmonization of the rules of personal
jurisdiction, especially among China, Australia and the US).
62 Adam R. Kleven, Minimum Virtual Contacts: A Framework for Specific Jurisdiction in
Cyberspace, 116 Mich. L. Rev. 785 (2018) (arguing that the present framework need not
be overhauled, but modified: for Internet cases, courts should consider a defendant’s
technological sophistication and the frequency with which it engages in tortious conduct.
Also, the reasonableness test should be simplified and applied seriously).
63 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
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over the Internet.64 Zippo categorizes a website in one of three ways.
Passive websites, such as those that contain only information and
advertisements, do not attract the jurisdiction of the fora in which they
are accessible.65 Active websites, such as those that clearly do business
over the Internet, will attract the jurisdiction of the fora in which they are
found.66 Between passive and active websites is the middle category of
interactive websites, such as those on which users can exchange
information with the host.
A website designed to facilitate or conduct business transactions
will often be characterized as interactive. Interactive websites may or
may not attract the jurisdiction of the fora in which they are found.67
Whether a court can exercise jurisdiction on an interactive website is
taken on a discretionary, case-by-case basis depending on the level of
interactivity and commerciality. As discussed later, much criticism has
been written about the ambiguity generated by the category of interactive
websites.68

Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1125-8.
JB Oxford Holdings, Inc. v. Net trade Inc., 76 F.Spp.2d 1363 (S.D.Fla.1999) (describing
a passive site as a website where users merely view advertisements for products and
services).
66 See CompuServe, Inc. v Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
67 Zippo at 1123 – 1124.
68 E.g. Jason Green, Is Zippo’s Sliding Scale a Slippery Slope of Uncertainty? A Case for
Abolishing Web Site Interactivity as a Conclusive Factor in Assessing Minimum Contacts
in Cyberspace, 34 THE JOHN MARSHALL LAW REVIEW, 1051 (2001) (arguing that the
passive/interactive distinction is insufficient because only those entirely passive or
entirely commercial websites can properly assess potential amenability to suit in the
forum); Emily Ekland, Scaling Back Zippo: The Downside to the Zippo Sliding Scale and
Proposed Alternatives to Its Uses, 5 Alb. Gov't L. Rev. 380 (2012) (noting that uncertainty
results from Zippo’s refusal to place websites with multiple interactive features in the
“active” category); Catherine Ross Dunham, Zippo-ing the Wrong Way: How the Internet
64
65
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ii.

The Targeting Test
The targeting test, sometimes called the effects test, is drawn from

Calder v. Jones,69 which established that a forum court has personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant that (i) commits an intentional
act expressly aimed at the forum where (ii) that act causes harm (a) felt
primarily in the forum and (b) the defendant knew that harm is likely to be
suffered in the forum.70

Although itself not an Internet case, Calder

inspired courts to apply the targeting test to the Internet. As a result,
courts in various circuits have phrased the test slightly differently.71 In the
Internet context, courts appear to have focused more on the “targeting”
aspect of the test and less on the effects component.72

For example, the

Fourth Circuit in Young v. New Haven Advocate adapted the Calder test by
simplifying the question to “[W]hether the [defendants] manifested an

Has Misdirected the Federal Courts in Their Personal Jurisdiction Analysis,
43 U.S.F. L. Rev. 559 (2009) (arguing that the Zippo test was a premature, nonfunctional and destabilizing reaction to the Internet).
69 Calder v Jones 467 U.S. 783 (1984).
70 Id. at 789. In Calder, Jones resided in California and her television career was centered
there. An allegedly libelous article was written by someone residing in Florida with few
contacts with California. The article was drawn from California sources and the
magazine had its largest circulation in California. The Supreme Court held that
“California is the focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered”, so based on the
“effects” of the defendants’ Florida conduct in California, California could exercise
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
71 E.g. Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs.,
Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 398 n.7 (4th
Cir. 2003) (finding that the following elements must be satisfied: (1) the defendant
committed an intentional tort; (2) the plaintiff felt the brunt of the harm in the forum,
such that the forum can be said to be the focal point of the harm; and (3) the defendant
expressly aimed his tortious conduct at the forum, such that the forum can be said to be
the focal point of the tortious activity). See also Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 703
(7th Cir. 2010) (requiring (1) intentional conduct (or intentional and allegedly tortious
conduct); (2) expressly aimed at the forum state; (3) with the defendant's knowledge that
the effects would be felt-that is the plaintiff would be injured-in the forum state).
72 Perhaps this was done to prevent a nonresident defendant from being amendable to
suit anywhere effects are alleged to be felt.
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intent to direct their website content […]to a Virginia audience”.73 In that
context, the effects component of the targeting test was diminished – what
matters is only whether the defendant targeted the forum.
It bears noting that there arises a question of whether the targeting
test requires the defendant to have targeted a forum exclusively.
Considering

that

contemporary

Internet

use

often

involves

the

dissemination of content and applications across the world,74 an exclusivity
requirement would dull the targeting test’s utility. The better view, I argue,
is that the targeting test sets forth a standard (say, the intentional use of
CDNs in the forum). Once that standard is met, the targeting test is
satisfied regardless of whether it may also apply to other fora in any given
case. This view is not without judicial support. As outlined above, Justice
Ginsburg, at least, would likely agree that the targeting test applies as long
as a defendant has aimed its activities at the forum irrespective of whether
other fora are also targeted.75
Some courts have combined the Zippo and targeting tests. ALS Scan
Inc v. Digital Service Consultants, Inc,76 finds that a state may, consistent
with due process, exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when
(i) the defendant directs electronic activity into the state, with (ii) the

315 F.3d 256, 263 (4th Cir. 2002)
Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 46 (1997) (Gertner J)
(stating poetically that “[t]he Internet has no territorial boundaries. To paraphrase
Gertrude Stein, as far as the Internet is concerned, not only is there perhaps “no there
there”, the “there” is everywhere where there is Internet”).
75 Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 886.
76 293 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2002).
73
74
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intention of engaging in business or other interactions within that state,
and (iii) when that activity creates, in a person within the state, a potential
cause of action cognizable in the state’s courts.77
ALS Scan, Inc. (“ALS”), a corporation in Maryland, claimed that
Alternative Products had reproduced and distributed ALS Scan’s
intellectual property without permission on the Internet.78 ALS Scan also
implicated Digital, Alternative Product’s Internet service provider, because
Digital had provided the service necessary to maintain Alternative
Product’s websites, which published the alleged infringing material.
Digital, a Georgia corporation having no contacts in Maryland, argued that
the district court in Maryland lacked personal jurisdiction.79 The district
court granted Digital’s motion to dismiss and ALS Scan appealed to the
Fourth Circuit, which ultimately affirmed.
In its de novo review, the Fourth Circuit appeared to welcome a
technological approach to the ways in which people show intent to enter a
forum. The Fourth Circuit noted that:
[T]he argument could still be made that the Internet's electronic signals are
surrogates for the person and that Internet users conceptually enter a State to the
extent that they send their electronic signals into the State, establishing those
minimum contacts sufficient [to justify personal jurisdiction] (emphasis added).80

ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 712.
Id., at 709. The intellectual property in controversy was adult photographs.
79 Id., at, 710.
80 Id., at 712.
77
78
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The words “electronic activity” in the ALS Scan test demonstrates that the
court was thinking not only of content tailored to the forum but also of
electronic activity, which would include technological activity beneath the
content layer of the Internet.81
Recognizing the seriousness of the changes imposed by the Internet,
the Fourth Circuit also foreshadowed that “advances in technology” would
one day inspire the Supreme Court to reconceive and rearticulate personal
jurisdiction.82

Clearly, the Fourth Circuit was not only alive to the

challenges precipitated by the Internet but also the need for new doctrine
commensurate

with

emerging

technologies.

Yet,

somewhat

anticlimactically, the Fourth Circuit did not take this analysis further. Just
what constitutes “electronic signals” or conceptually entering a state was
never developed. And so, without deeply considering what it means to
“electronically transmit” content into a forum, the Fourth Circuit simply
stated that too broad an approach to minimum contacts would result in an
objectionable form of universal jurisdiction.83
Although the Fourth Circuit intuited the need for a technological
approach, it lacked the vocabulary to make one. Instead, the Fourth Circuit
engaged in a rudimentary and cursory consideration of telephones and

Content based tests focus on what users see on the face of a website or application.
Content based tests would look, for example, at whether a website markets material
specific to a forum or adopts the dominant language of the forum. By contrast, a
technological approach looks at factors agnostic to content, such as the use of content
delivery networks which, by their very name, are the conduits of web content.
82 Id., at 714.
83 Id., at 713.
81
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computers.84 The CDN approach, therefore, picks up where ALS Scan left
gaps.

I articulate an approach that will show what it means to

“conceptually” enter a forum using “electronic signals” as “surrogates” for
the person.85
II.

CONTENT DELIVERY NETWORKS AS NEW INDICIA
FOR SPECIFIC JURISDICTION

A. What Are CDNs?
A CDN is an infrastructure placed on top of the Internet that pushes
content closer to users.86 It is a large distributed system of multiple servers
deployed all over the world, sometimes called edge or cache servers.87 Such
nomenclature is self-illuminating. Consider, for example, a typical home or
office layout where computers, mobile phones, and tablets are connected to
the Internet. These devices are connected to the same local network. To
connect to a different network, a connector, such as a router, is required.
Alternatively, a server can be placed at the edge of the network so that
content can be loaded onto it and made available to another network, hence
the name edge server.88

Id. at 714 (stating that “even though the medium is still often a telephone wire, the
breadth and frequency of electronic contacts through computers has resulted in billions of
interstate connections and millions of interstate transactions entered into solely through
the vehicle of the Internet”).
85 Id., at 712.
86 B. Molina, V. Ruiz, I. Alonso, C. E. Palau, J. C. Guerri & M. Esteve, A Closer Look at a
Content Delivery Network Implementation, 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 12TH IEEE
MEDITERRANEAN ELECTROTECHNICAL CONFERENCE 685 (2004).
87 What is a CDN? CLOUDFLARE, https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/cdn/what-is-a-cdn/
(last visited Mar. 19, 2020).
88 What is an Edge Server, CLOUDFLARE
https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/cdn/glossary/edge-server/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2020).
84
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A CDN allows people and businesses – or, the defendant, for the
purposes of this discussion – to deliver content faster and more reliably to
target locations.89 It accelerates the delivery of websites and applications
by caching content, hence the name “cache” server, which means it stores
replicas of text, image, audio, video so that when a user requests certain
data, that request can be served by a nearby server rather a far-off origin
server.90 The figures below demonstrate the effect of a CDN in reducing the
time data would otherwise take to travel from an origin server to the user.
Figure 1: transmitting content without a CDN.91

Origin server

6 seconds
User

Content Distribution Networks, AKAMAI,
https://www.akamai.com/us/en/resources/content-distribution-network.jsp (last visited
Mar 19, 2020).
90 Id.
91 What is a CDN? IMPERVA https://www.imperva.com/learn/performance/what-is-cdnhow-it-works/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). Note that the numerical figures provided are
for reference only.
89
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Figure 2: transmitting content with a CDN.92
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CDNs
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Edge server

of
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infrastructure.93 Akamai, one of two largest CDN providers (the other being
Cloudflare) has more than 240,000 servers in over 130 countries around the
world.94

Having more edge servers in more locations increases the

probability that a cache is physically close to a client, and could reduce endto-end latency.95 A company or individual will elect to use a CDN in the
forum so that people located in the forum will have faster, 96 more reliable

Id.
Sipat Triukose, Zhihua Wen, & Michael Rabinovich, Measuring a commercial content
delivery network, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 20TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORLD WIDE
WEB, 467 (2011).
94 AKAMAI https://tinyurl.com/qmwo2wk (last visited Mar. 23, 2020).
95 Anne Edmundson, Paul Schmitt, Nick Feamster & Jennifer Rexford, OCDN: Oblivious
Content Distribution Networks, arXiv:1711.01478 (2017).
96 Arwen Price, Web Performance Impacts Conversation Rates, LOADSTORM (Apr. 9, 2014)
http://loadstorm.com/2014/04/infographic-web-performance-impacts-conversion-rates/
(claiming that 25% of users will abandon a website if it takes longer than 4 seconds to
92
93
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and better quality access to that company’s content.97 Considering that
intention, evinced through purposeful availment, is the touchstone of
specific jurisdiction, it is important to scrutinize how CDN use may indicate
intention.98
B. Mapping the CDN Approach on Purposeful Availment
i.

“CDN with Intention” Fits with Purposeful Availment
Courts may employ the CDN approach if the defendant had

instructed, or otherwise elected, for a CDN to be used in the forum. Such
instruction or election constitutes intention and, by extension, purposeful
availment. When people, whether individuals or companies, want to set up
websites, they usually contract with a web hosting service, which is a
company that provides space on a server (which it either owns or rents).99
The web hosting service stores a person’s website on a server and makes it
available on the Internet.100 But who chooses the CDN? Is it the user (the
person who makes the website) or is it the web hosting service? Some web
hosting services, or CDN providers, give its customers the option to serve a

load, 74% of users will abandon a mobile site if it takes longer than 5 seconds to load,
46% of users will not return to poorly performing sites).
97 Anna MacLachlan, Why you should use a content delivery network, FASTLY (MAR., 2,
2015)https://www.fastly.com/blog/why-you-should-use-content-delivery-network (noting
that the farther customers are away from a company’s CDN, the slower that website or
application will load, tending to frustrate customers).
98 The Essential CDN Guide, IMPERVA (Last visited Mar. 19, 2020).
https://www.imperva.com/learn/performance/what-is-cdn-how-it-works/ (noting that most
people will use a CDN whether they know it or not).
99 Nick Schaferhoff, How to Create a Website, WEBSITESETUP (Mar. 11, 2020)
https://websitesetup.org.
100 What is Web Hosting? Website.com Learning Center,
https://www.website.com/beginnerguide/webhosting/6/1/what-is-web-hosting?.ws (last
visited Mar. 19, 220).
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particular state, country, or geographic region. Proving this choice is critical
to the CDN approach’s applicability. Whether that choice was exercised in
any given case shall be an enquiry taken on a case-by-case basis as a
question of evidence. Fact-dependency notwithstanding, there are at least
two general situations in which the intentional use of a CDN to enter a
forum may be established.
First, some popular web hosting services, such as Pair, and some
CDN service providers, such as CloudFront, let its customers select the
region or state to target or even a particular edge server to use. Pair offers
its customers the choice of using a CDN. For an additional cost, Pair
customers can use Pair’s CDN to target certain geographic regions in North
America or Europe.101

Similarly, CloudFront, Amazon’s web service

offering CDN provision, grants its clients the option to serve, or not serve,
particular countries through the provision of a “geo-restriction” feature.
CloudFront’s website makes this express:
[T]he Geo Restriction feature lets you specify a list of countries in which your users
can access your content. Alternatively, you can specify the countries in which your
users cannot access your content. In both cases, CloudFront responds to a request
from a viewer in a restricted country with an HTTP status code 403 (Forbidden).
102

PAIR, https://www.pair.com/solutions/content-delivery-network/ (last visited Mar. 19,
2020) (offering to deal with customers who wish to directly serve certain geographic
zones).
102 See FAQ, AMAZON CLOUDFRONT https://aws.amazon.com/cloudfront/faqs/ (last visited
Mar. 23, 2020).
101
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In yet another example, Cloudflare allows its corporate clients to
select which edge servers they wish to use. In 2014, Cloudflare entered into
an agreement with Baidu (the Chinese equivalent of Google) under which
Cloudflare used its CDN to enable websites to load more quickly across
certain regions in China.103 In a period of 24 hours, it was estimated that
the service saved about a total of 243 years that users in China would have
otherwise spent waiting for websites to load.104 The existence, and exercise,
of these options is critical to implementing the CDN approach. Since a CDN
allows a person (or defendant) to “push” its content into the forum faster
and more reliability, this intentional use, once established, represents a
commercial advantage capable of constituting purposeful availment.
Second, individuals and companies having the appropriate resources
and know-how can host their own websites without the need to employ a
web hosting service. Those self-hosting entities would naturally have to
select their own CDNs and determine the reach of that network by
contracting directly with CDN providers in a manner that stipulates the
location of the edge servers to be used. In rare situations, the self-hosting
entities are the CDN providers themselves that physically establish data
centers around the world in which edge servers are housed.

Paul Mozur, Baidu and Cloudflare Boost Users Over China’s Great Firewall, THE NEW
YORK TIMES (Sep. 14, 2015) https://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/14/chinas-baidu-andcloudflare-in-partnership-to-boost-website-speeds.html.
104 Id.
103
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Once intention is established, the CDN approach comports entirely
with the prevailing view on purposeful availment, namely Justice
Ginsburg’s approach in Nicastro, which, although a dissenting view,
actually reflects the sensible and generally accepted plurality view of
Justice O’Connor in Asahi. In Asahi, Justice O’Connor wrote:
The "substantial connection" between a defendant and the forum State necessary
for a finding of minimum contacts must derive from an action purposely directed
toward the forum State, and the mere placement of a product into the stream of
commerce is not such an act, even if done with an awareness that the stream will
sweep the product into the forum State absent additional conduct indicating an
intent to serve the forum state market.105

The “CDN with intention” approach accords with Justice O’Connor’s view
because deliberately using a CDN to direct content towards the forum
evinces “something more” than awareness and therefore constitutes a
“substantial connection”. As long as a defendant intentionally chooses to
use a CDN to enter a forum, the CDN approach will work.
Comparing again with Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Nicastro, using
a CDN with intention is similar to making a “marketing arrangement” with
a company to “promote and distribute” content “anywhere and everywhere
in the United States the distributor can attract purchasers”.106 A web
hosting service is analogous to a distributor in product liability cases such
as Asahi and Nicastro. The defendant is making an arrangement with a

105
106

Asahi, 480 U.S. at 104 (O’Connor J).
Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
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service provider to distribute web content or applications throughout the
world, including the forum. Although the CDN approach works where there
is intention, what of the counterfactual in which a website maker is merely
aware that its content would be available across the world, but never
intended to deploy CDNs in a particular place or at all?
ii.

“CDN without intention” Does Not Fit with Purposeful
Availment
Unlike Pair, CloudFront, and Cloudflare, many other service

providers do not appear to offer its users the option to target regions. WP
Engine, another web hosting service, simply states that users can pay more
money to utilize a “global CDN” network.107 In such a case, presumably,
WP Engine will determine which CDNs are to be used based on where the
user’s site receives the most traffic. To be clear, in order to be faithful to
purposeful availment, I do not propose that those who simply contract with
a web hosting service, but do not know that they have used a CDN in a
certain place, have purposefully availed themselves of the forum that the
CDN serves. I maintain that the CDN approach should apply only to those
that have intended to use a CDN to target a forum. Intention is a question
of evidence demonstrated by the production of correspondence or an
agreement revealing that a defendant had elected, or instructed its service
provider, to use a certain CDN.

E.g. WP ENGINE https://wpengine.com (last visited Mar. 19, 2020) (offering certain
packages with a “global CDN”).
107
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III.

CDN’S WEAKNESS: NARROW APPLICABILITY IF
STRICT INTENTION IS REQUIRED

The above discussion throws into relief the CDN approach’s
weakness. Remaining faithful to purposeful availment means that the
CDN approach only applies in the few cases where people chose to use a
particular CDN to target a forum. Anecdotal experience counsels that
most individuals, whether they post content on social media platforms
such as Instagram, or make their own websites for a blog or small
business, do not know the intricacies of CDN technology, let alone make a
choice as to its geographic use. Even sophisticated corporations that use
websites to market their goods and services may not necessarily know
whether they are using a CDN in a particular forum.
A trade-off subsists between the interests of the plaintiff and the
defendant. Remaining faithful to purposeful availment, and thereby
narrowing the scope of the CDN approach, favors the defendant’s interests
and abates the plaintiff’s. Expanding purposeful availment to include
imputed intention promotes the plaintiff’s interest and diminishes the
defendant’s. The prevailing jurisprudence favors the former, yet the CDN
approach – seeking expansive utility – wants the latter.
A. Circumventing the Weakness: Arguing for Imputing
Intention
Surrendering strict faithfulness to purposeful availment achieves
broader applicability to the CDN approach. This does not necessarily
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mean abandoning intention altogether. Rather, it requires redefining
intention to encompass imputed intention. On one view, it is reasonable
to argue that intention should be imputed on the defendant when it enters
into an agreement with a web hosting or CDN provider regardless of
whether the defendant had chosen to target a region or use a particular
CDN. If people engage the service of a web hosting or CDN provider, they
should know, or be expected to find out, where their content is delivered
and, specifically, the locales, if any, that are given special focus through
the use of CDNs.
The fiction that obligations might arise not by express consent but
by operation of law is not novel.108 Many legal topics bear such a pedigree,
for example: knowing receipt, where liability arises for the receipt of
monies paid by mistake;109 equitable contribution, where an insurer seeks
reimbursement from its co-insurers after the first insurer pays more than
its share; marshalling,110 where a junior creditor subrogates to the
position of a senior creditor to satisfy the former’s debt.111 These scenarios

See William Swadling, The Fiction of the Constructive Trust 64 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBLEMS 399 (2011).
109 E.g. Houghton v. Fayers [2000] 1 B.C.L.C. 511 (C.A.) (Nourse L.J.) (indicating that a
defendant would be liable if he knew, or ought to have known, that he had received either
funds which were misapplied in the breach of duty, or their proceeds); see also El Ajou v
Dollar Land Holdings plc [1993] EWCA Civ 4 (finding that constructive knowledge was
sufficient concering the receipt of property in breach of trust).
110 E.g. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Gen. Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 322 N.Y.S.2d
704 (1971) (finding for a general right of contribution where there is concurrent
insurance, even if the policy does not include an express provision for apportionment).
111 E.g. Sowell v. Federal Reserve Bank, 268 U.S. 449 (1925); Miles v The Official
Receiver (1963) 109 C.L.R. 50; Szepietowski v The Serious Organised Crime Agency
[2013] UKSC 65; see also William Gummow and John Stumbles, Marshalling, the
Personal Property Securities Act 2009 and third party securities: Highbury and
108

33

have in common the lack of a contract bearing the hallmarks of party
autonomy and express consent. Expansion of purposeful availment to
include constructive intention or knowledge, therefore, would cohere with,
and at least not rebuke, well-established themes in Anglo-American
jurisprudence.
Closest to imputing intention to use a CDN is perhaps the doctrine
of imputed knowledge as applied to corporations, under which notice to an
agent acting within the scope of its authority is imputed to the
principal.112 Arguably, when a defendant contracts with a service provider
to disseminate the defendant’s content to the world, the provider occupies
a position akin to an agent and the defendant the principal. On this
analysis, even if the defendant did not know which CDN it is using – or
whether it was using a CDN at all – the service provider’s knowledge shall
be imputed on the defendant.
Pro-plaintiff policy considerations favor this view. A plaintiff would
likely be perfectly content for knowledge to be imputed because it probably
commenced proceedings in the forum to its advantage. Whatever
advantage that may be – convenience, the location of assets upon which to
lay claim, or the availability of more favorable remedies – there exists a
general presumption to respect the plaintiff’s choice of forum; granted,

Szepietowski – New applications of enduring principles, 25 JOURNAL OF BANKING AND
FINANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 106 (2014).
112 In re Hopper-Morgan Co. (D. C. 1908) 158 Fed. 351; see also Strickland v. Capital City
Mills (1906) 74 S. C. 16, 26, 54 S. E. 220 (applying the rule to attorneys and their clients).
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however, that the degree of deference conferred decreases if the plaintiff
were foreign.113 This view may gain some persuasive, but far from
binding, support from recent Supreme Court case law in BMS, wherein
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent was clearly motivated by due process for the
plaintiffs.114
B. The Weakness Prevails: Arguing Against Imputing Intention
But policy considerations cut both ways. The defendant may have
contracted with a service provider, and entrusted the decisions pertaining
to CDN allocation to the service provider, precisely because the defendant
had no subject matter expertise in the matter. Technical knowledge is
required to understand the Internet infrastructure and the use of
CDNs.115 Even if the service provider occupied the position of an agent, its
special relation to the subject matter may be one that renders disclosure
unwarranted and, therefore, imputed intention inappropriate.
An expansive approach to intention is also doctrinally objectionable
because it comes dangerously close to the generally rejected “stream of

See Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947) (finding for a
strong presumption of convenience where the plaintiff has brought an action in its home
forum). But see Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (stating that a foreign
plaintiff’s choice of a US forum receives less deference than the same choice by a US
national or resident. Foreigners are more likely to sue in the US for strategic reasons,
such as contingency agreements, involved discovery processes, higher damage levels).
114Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 786 (Sotomayor, J., in dissent) (stating that the
Court’s opinion in this case will make it profoundly difficult for plaintiffs who are injured
in different States by a defendant’s nationwide course of conduct to sue that defendant in
a single, consolidated action).
115 E.g. Wenjie Jiang et al, Cooperative Content Distribution and Traffic Engineering in
an ISP Network, Proceedings of the Eleventh International Joint Conference on
Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems, 239 (2009).
113
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commerce only” approach.116

As discussed in Part I, Justice Brennan

advocated for the “stream of commerce only” view:
A defendant who has placed goods in the stream of commerce benefits economically
from the retail sale of the final product in the forum State, and indirectly benefits
from the State’s laws that regulate and facilitate commercial activity
[…]Accordingly, most courts and commentators have found that jurisdiction
premised on the placement of a product into the stream of commerce is consistent
with the Due Process Clause, and have not required a showing of additional
conduct.117

A proponent of Justice Brennan’s view might argue that a defendant who
has placed a website or application on the Internet, and contracted with a
hosting service to disseminate its content using a “global CDN” service that
targets the world-at-large, is reaping the commercial benefits of entering
the forum state. As long as the defendant is aware that it had chosen the
“global CDN” option, it should be aware that its content would likely be
swept (by the “stream of commerce”) into the forum state.

An expansive approach also comes dangerously close to the rejected “foreseeability”
approach. Foreseeability is associated with “stream of commerce – only”. Indeed, the
latter grew out of the former. In Volkswagen, Justice Blackmun in dissent argued for a
foreseeability approach. In his view, it was foreseeable a car will wander far from its
place of license or distribution. This view was rejected by the Volkswagen majority,
which found that foreseeability is not a touchstone of personal jurisdiction. See
Volkswagen 444 U.S. at 287 (1980) (stating that foreseeability alone is not a sufficient
benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause).
117 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan J).
116
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But as discussed in Part I, the Supreme Court has not adopted
Justice Brennan’s “stream of commerce – only” approach. Instead, recent
cases only emphasize the continuing importance of purposeful availment.
Until further cases seeking to eschew or loosen purposeful availment, I
maintain – as I have from the outset – that the CDN approach should only
apply to the narrow set of cases for which intention can be demonstrated.
IV.

REJOINDER: PREDICTABLE AND MEASURABLE

A. Predictability: The Certainty of a Binary Test
Whatever a strict intention requirement might do to besmirch the
CDN approach’s scope is supplanted by the benefits occasioned.
Regardless of whether the CDN approach demands intention, it brings
every advantage of a binary test. People either use a CDN or they do not.
Of those who do, they either use a CDN in, or near, the forum or they do
not. Unlike the targeting and Zippo tests, the CDN Approach does not
invite the court to engage in a discretionary, multifactorial balancing
exercise. By presenting a binary, the CDN approach avoids any ambiguity
about whether purposeful availment has been established. While a binary
test may not have the flexibility of a multifactor approach, parties to a
litigation at least have greater certainty and confidence as to the likely
outcome. A survey of the lower court decisions in the US – and even in
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other jurisdictions– reveals inconsistent, and at times confused,
applications of the degree of activity and targeting tests.118
One of the many complaints levied against the Zippo test is that the
middle category of interactive websites is so nebulous that it fails to give
website hosts proper notice about when they might be amenable to the
fora in which their content is found.119 Similarly, the targeting test
ascertains a defendant’s subjective intention by at times attaching
inappropriate weight to factors that may have really just arisen out of
custom or fortuity. Both approaches call on a judge to throw a heap of
factors on a table and slice and dice to taste, with a different recipe
potentially emerging for every other meal.120
i.

The Zippo Test’s Uncertainty
Recall from Part I that Zippo categorizes a website in one of three

ways: passive, interactive, or active. While passive and active websites
may be relatively easy to ascertain,121 interactive websites, which occupy
disproportionately vast ground compared with passive and active

E.g. CoolSavings.com, Inc. v. IQ.CommerceCorp., 53 F.Supp.2d 1000, FN3 (N.D.Ill.
1999) (finding such difficult with Zippo’s three category test that the court declined to
apply the test altogether); see also Hurley v. Cancun Play Oasis International Hotels,
1999 WL 718556 (E.D.Pa 1999) (rejecting jurisdiction with respect to a website allowing
customers making hotel reservations); but see Decker v Circus49 F.Supp.2d 743 (D.N.J.
1999) (finding a similar website to be commercial, and presumably “active”, yet also
declining to accept jurisdiction).
119 Eckland, supra note 67.
120 See Reins. Co. of Am., Inc. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat 902 F.2d 1275 (7th
Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook J). This metaphor is adapted from Justice Easterbook’s usage.
121 But note that the distinction among passive, active and interactive websites seems
arbitrary – passive websites are equally capable of committing, for example, fraud,
defamation, trademark infringement as active websites.
118
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websites, are difficult to assess.122 Interactive websites include websites
that do one or more of the following: contain hyperlinks, invite email
communication, provide enquiry forms, facilitates the posting of
comments, make claims, offer downloads free-of-charge, gain advertising
revenue or even engage in the silent collection of user information, such as
browsing habits.123 This is a non-exhaustive list of things that could bring
an otherwise passive website into the purview of interactivity.124 Most
websites today are likely to have at least one of these factors. Accordingly,
jurisdiction over most websites or applications, are effectively a matter of
judicial discretion, at least under the Zippo test. Discretion begets
unpredictability. For example, the confusion engendered by the Zippo
test, and its incompatibility to the nuances of the Internet, is played out in
the recent case of Seaver v. Estate of Cazes.125
Seaver involved a Massachusetts defendant, the Tor Project, Inc
(“Tor”), which creates software enabling access to the Darknet126 –

Dennis T. Yokoyama, You Can't Always Use the Zippo Code: The Fallacy of a Uniform
Theory of Internet Personal Jurisdiction, 54 DePaul L. Rev. 1147 (2005) (noting that the
middle ground has produced a black hole of confusion and left courts struggling with
whether an interactive site constitutes purposeful availment).
123 LILIAN EDWARDS AND JORDAN HATCHER, CONSUMER PRIVACY LAW 2: DATA COLLECTION,
PROFILING AND TARGETING, 511 (Lilian Edwards & Charlotte Waelde eds., 3rd ed. 2009).
124 Zippo provided scant guidance to assessing the middle ground. “Interactivity” means a
website that allows the user to exchange information with the defendant. Courts should
also take into account the commercial nature of the information exchanged. See Zippo,
952 F. Supp. at 1124.
125 Seaver v. Estate of Cazes, Case No. 2:18-cv-712-DB (D. Utah May. 20, 2019)
126 Note that the definition of Darknet has not received universal consensus. Accordingly,
we might alternatively say that the Tor Project, Inc enables access to “Tor hidden
services” (instead of the “Darknet”).
122
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portions of the Internet not readily available for public view.127 Tor’s
website allows the world-at-large to download free software called the Tor
Browser, an application similar to Google Chrome, Safari, or Firefox (in
fact, it is a customized version of Firefox), which allows people to access
the Darknet.128 The late Grant Seaver, then aged 13, ingested a drug
allegedly obtained from an e-commerce website called Alphabay on the
Darknet. His bereaved parents sued Tor for products liability, negligence
and civil conspiracy.
On the question of minimum contacts, the district court in Utah
applied Zippo’s degree of activity test to conclude that Tor is a commercial
interactive website that attracts Utah’s jurisdiction. The court’s basis for
so finding was that Tor enables commercial transactions on the Darknet
that would not otherwise be possible. But such reasoning conflates the
distinction between a website (Tor’s website which offers Tor Browser for
download) and a web browsing application (the Tor Browser itself), an
intermediary that facilitates access to other websites. Asserting

Darren Guccione, What is the dark web? How to access it and what you’ll find, CSO
ONLINE (Mar 5. 2020) https://www.csoonline.com/article/3249765/what-is-the-dark-webhow-to-access-it-and-what-youll-find.html.
128 The Tor Browser hides a user’s identity and location by directing that user’s Internet
traffic through layers of random relays hosted by other Tor Browser users. As traffic
enters one relay, one layer of encryption is stripped and sent to the next relay.
Eventually, when the traffic exits the last relay to the user’s desired target, that last
relay has no information about the origins of user’s traffic except for the very last relay
from which the packet came.
127
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jurisdiction over Alphabay,129 the Darknet website that allegedly sold the
drug to Grant, would have been more appropriate.
Not only was the court’s application of the Zippo test technically
unsound, it was also objectionable on policy grounds. The court effectively
held that Tor was subject to the jurisdiction of any fora in which its users
conduct Darknet transactions. Such a result is as repugnant as saying
that Google Chrome is liable for the faulty products I purchase on
Amazon.
ii.

The Targeting Test’s Uncertainty
Like the Zippo test, the targeting test suffers from unpredictable

and, at times, incoherent application. Consider, for example, the
multifactorial approach taken in Football Dataco Ltd v. Sportradar
GmbH.130 The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) applied the targeting
test and found that the English High Court, representing the forum in
which the relevant data was received, had jurisdiction.
The ECJ noted, first, that the subject matter of the data – English
and Scottish football league matches – was likely of interest to the UK
public. Second, the defendant’s website operator knew that the data
would likely be accessed by the UK public. Third, the defendant provided

Alphabay was an online Darknet market that was shut down in 2017. Its founder,
Alexandre Cazes (giving the case its name) died from apparent suicide. Presumably, the
court was so adamant on analyzing jurisdiction over Tor for the very reason that both
Alphabay and its founder were unavailable.
130 Football Dataco Ltd v. Sportradar GmbH (Case C-173/11, 2012).
129
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access to its football data in English, which suggest an intention to target
the UK.
But how compelling are these factors? The English and Scottish
football league possibly attracts fans from all over the world.131 Although
a language such as Japanese, which is primarily spoken in Japan, might
be an appropriate indicator of targeting, the use of English – the most
prevalent language in the world and the dominant language of the
Internet – could hardly counsel towards a finding of personal jurisdiction.
The application of the targeting test here, like many other instances,
seems to be somewhat results-driven.132
B. Measurability: Determining Whether the Defendant is Using
a CDN
The CDN approach avoids the uncertainty of unpredictable results
and the controversy of discretionary opinions. It is also easily measurable.
Inferring whether someone is using a CDN is not difficult. Nearly every
computer is capable of determining whether a defendant had used a CDN
to enter the forum. While, today, most computer users rely on a graphic
interface, with menu-driven interactions such as emails, Internet
browsers, word processors, other computer functions can be performed
with a “command line” interface. A command line interface processes
commands to the computer in lines of texts, as opposed to, for example,

Where to watch the Premier League on US TV and streaming, WORLDSOCCERTALK
(Oct. 10, 2019) https://worldsoccertalk.com/watch-premier-league-on-us-tv-internet/.
132 E.g. Dow Jones & Co. Inc. v. Joseph Gutnick 210 CLR 575 (2002).
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clicking an icon on a desktop or clicking “send” to dispatch an email. This
command line interface – “Terminal”, as it is known on Mac computers –
can be used to infer whether a company is using a CDN in the forum.
One of the farthest internationally recognizable landmarks from
New York City is the Sydney Opera House in Sydney, Australia. Most
people, at least, can appreciate its geographic distance considering that the
travel time by flight is over 20 hours.133 The following steps may be taken
to ascertain whether the Sydney Opera House is using a CDN to enable
New Yorkers to have efficient access to Opera House content.
First, Terminal can provide information about the website address
www.sydneyoperahouse.com.134 Typing the command “dig” into Terminal
will result in information about www.sydneyoperahouse.com’s host
address, mail exchange, name server, and other related information.135 For
present purposes, the most relevant information is the “CNAME”,136 which
suggests that the Sydney Opera House is using CloudFront CDN services.

Scott McCartney, The New York-to-Sydney Flight That Redefines Long Haul, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2019) https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-york-to-sydney-flight-thatredefines-long-distance-11571670328.
134 J. Mays, How to use Dig, LIQUID WEB (Feb 14, 2020)
https://www.liquidweb.com/kb/how-to-use-dig/.
135 Id.
136 See P. Mockapetris, Domain Names – Concepts and Facilities (Nov. 1987)
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1034. CNAME means Canonical Name record. It refers to a
record in the Domain Name System database that indicates the true host name of the
computer to which the record is associated. The CNAME is essentially an alias. For
example, if both columbia.edu and www.columbia.edu refer to the same website hosted by
the same server, then, to link these two websites together, a CNAME record might be
created for www.columbia.edu pointing it to columbia.edu. Further note: the Domain
Name System refers to the naming system for computers and other devices connected to
the Internet. It translates domain names to Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, which is
analogous to a street address. Just as a street address determines where a letter should
be sent, an IP address identifies computers on the Internet.
133
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Discussed above, CloudFront is a CDN offered by Amazon with 205 edge
servers located on five continents, spanning Europe (United Kingdom,
Ireland, The Netherlands, Germany, Spain), Asia (Hong Kong, Singapore,
Japan, Taiwan and India), Australia, South America, as well as in several
major cities in the United States.137

The figure below demonstrates

Terminal command results suggesting that the Sydney Opera House is
using a CloudFront CDN (note the words “cloudfront” under the subheading
“ANSWER SECTION” below).
Patricks-Air:~ patricklin$ dig www.sydneyoperahouse.com
; <<>> DiG 9.10.6 <<>> www.sydneyoperahouse.com
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 49023
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 5, AUTHORITY:
ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;www.sydneyoperahouse.com. IN
A
;; ANSWER SECTION:
www.sydneyoperahouse.com.132
d3gdbrxsb9xhmf.cloudfront.net.
d3gdbrxsb9xhmf.cloudfront.net. 60 IN
d3gdbrxsb9xhmf.cloudfront.net. 60 IN
d3gdbrxsb9xhmf.cloudfront.net. 60 IN
d3gdbrxsb9xhmf.cloudfront.net. 60 IN
;; Query time: 17 msec
;; SERVER: 192.168.10.1#53(192.168.10.1)
;; WHEN: Mon Mar 23 16:40:36 EDT 2020
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 160
Patricks-Air:~ patricklin$

IN
A
A
A
A

0,

CNAME
13.225.212.48
13.225.212.119
13.225.212.124
13.225.212.118

Figure 3: Dig command result for www.sydneyoperahouse.com
The next question is whether the Sydney Opera House management
even knows that it is using a CloudFront CDN with an edge server likely

AMAZON CLOUDFRONT KEY FEATURES, AMAZON
https://aws.amazon.com/cloudfront/features/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2020)
137
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close to New York (inferring the location of the CDN will be addressed
below). It appears that CloudFront, by default, provides its customers
access to its entire global CDN infrastructure.138 Accordingly, the Sydney
Opera House is not necessarily aware that it is using a CDN so that New
Yorkers can have better access to www.sydneyoperahouse.com. If that lack
of knowledge were the case, then the CDN approach applies only if the court
one day accepts imputed intention (per Part III.A). The ensuing analysis is
still applicable to other cases, however marginal, where a user did
specifically ask for a CDN in the forum to be used.
Second, running a “ping” command will confirm that the CDN server
is close. The ping command sends packets to a specific Internet protocol
(“IP”) address and reports on how long it took to transmit the packet and
receive a response.139 The figure below indicates the results of a ping
command. Note that the ping command will continuously send out packets
until it is asked to stop; therefore, the number of entries in the figure below
is arbitrary.

Id.
Brady Gavin, How to Use the Ping Command to Test Your Network, HOW TO GEEK
(Jun. 21, 2018) https://www.howtogeek.com/355664/how-to-use-ping-to-test-yournetwork/.
138
139
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Patricks-Air:~ patricklin$ ping www.sydneyoperahouse.com
PING d3gdbrxsb9xhmf.cloudfront.net (99.84.126.117): 56 data
bytes
64 bytes from 99.84.126.117: icmp_seq=0 ttl=237 time=2.944 ms
64 bytes from 99.84.126.117: icmp_seq=1 ttl=237 time=13.935 ms
64 bytes from 99.84.126.117: icmp_seq=2 ttl=237 time=11.155 ms
64 bytes from 99.84.126.117: icmp_seq=3 ttl=237 time=11.786 ms
64 bytes from 99.84.126.117: icmp_seq=4 ttl=237 time=3.193 ms
64 bytes from 99.84.126.117: icmp_seq=5 ttl=237 time=13.795 ms
64 bytes from 99.84.126.117: icmp_seq=6 ttl=237 time=7.572 ms
64 bytes from 99.84.126.117: icmp_seq=7 ttl=237 time=7.883 ms
64 bytes from 99.84.126.117: icmp_seq=8 ttl=237 time=63.087 ms
64 bytes from 99.84.126.117: icmp_seq=9 ttl=237 time=100.622 ms
64 bytes from 99.84.126.117: icmp_seq=10 ttl=237 time=132.436 ms
64 bytes from 99.84.126.117: icmp_seq=12 ttl=237 time=2.427 ms
64 bytes from 99.84.126.117: icmp_seq=13 ttl=237 time=2.772 ms
64 bytes from 99.84.126.117: icmp_seq=14 ttl=237 time=11.785 ms
64 bytes from 99.84.126.117: icmp_seq=15 ttl=237 time=17.982 ms
64 bytes from 99.84.126.117: icmp_seq=16 ttl=237 time=17.181 ms

Figure 4: ping results for www.sydneyoperahouse.com.
When running a ping command, the most accurate time is the
minimum time in a sample. The fastest entry of 2.427 ms is the most
accurate referent in the sample size.140 The speed of light in a vacuum is
299,792,458 meters/second. In fiber optic cables, light travels at about
200,000,000 meters/second, depending on the type of fiber that is used.141
Accordingly, it is safe to infer that www.sydneyoperahouse.com is using an
edge server close to New York – physics so dictate.
2.427 milliseconds x 200,000,000 meters/seconds (the speed of light)
= 485,400 meters.
Many things can cause a packet to be delayed, such as congestion, whether on the
network generally or on the user’s computer.
141 See Kevin Miller, Calculating Optical Fiber Latency, M2 OPTICS, INC (Jan. 9, 2012)
https://www.m2optics.com/blog/bid/70587/Calculating-Optical-Fiber-Latency
140
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Accordingly, the edge server from which www.sydneyoperahouse.com is
delivering its content to someone at Columbia University in New York is
located less than 500 kilometers away.

In reality, the edge server is

probably much closer because most of the 2.427 seconds is really a result of
lag from the computer that sent the packet, the computer that received it,
or any delay that occurred along the route. Taking that into account, it is
certain that the packet is not travelling all the way to Sydney, Australia but
likely somewhere in the United States, close to or in New York.
There is evidence that the Sydney Opera House uses an edge server
in a CDN to deliver content more efficiently to US audiences. Whether such
decision was intentional is another question. The likely answer, given
CloudFront’s business model, appears to be that it was not volitional on
Sydney Opera House’s part; rather, it was probably its web hosting
provider’s doing. Nonetheless, the same analysis can be applied to other
users for which there was intention or if the service provider’s volition may
be imputed on the Sydney Opera House.
In a personal jurisdiction matter, the above two-pronged process can
take place to (i) ask whether the non-resident defendant entered into an
agreement with its hosting service or CDN provider to specifically target a
certain region or forum and (ii) investigate and infer, using any computer’s
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command line function as outlined above, whether a CDN in or close to the
forum is in fact being used (if this cannot be inferred it would be a matter
of evidence). If both questions are found in the affirmative, then purposeful
availment may be established.
V.

CONCLUSION
Despite developments in the technology and use of the Internet,

prevailing US approaches to Internet jurisdiction still bear the premillennial pedigree of the targeting and Zippo tests, which are largely
agnostic to how a defendant engages with the Internet backbone. The
Supreme Court, while aware of the challenges posed by the Internet, has
not settled the question of when a defendant’s activities on the Internet will
be enough to attract personal jurisdiction.142
Beneath the content layer of the Internet – that is, the websites,
blogs, images, emails, social media applications – are data routes by which
information is transmitted. Observing that limited or no enquiry has taken
place into the technological backbone of the Internet, I have argued that the
defendant’s intentional use of CDN in a forum will almost certainly
establish purposeful availment. The CDN approach is not only predictable
but also gives courts the facility to confront Internet jurisdiction through
technological lenses.

142

Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 290 n.9 (2014)

48

The same year Zippo was handed down, the Clinton Administration
issued a Presidential Directive calling for the Federal Government and its
laws to “recognize the unique qualities of the Internet including its
decentralized nature and its tradition of bottom-up governance.”143 What
Zippo and its progeny failed to do, I hope to have achieved.

143

Presidential Directive Electronic Commerce (July 1997).
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